Chapters

Walk through the visual explanation →

Authentication is not authorization

Authentication identifies an actor. Authorization decides whether that actor may perform a particular action in the current context. A valid sign-in does not establish authority over a Production, resource, conversation or workflow decision.

Role names describe work. They are useful for people and for organization, but a Director or Department Lead label is not sufficient evidence of a software permission. Current scoped capabilities and subject policy remain the authority boundary.

Audience describes intent

Audience selects intended recipients or reviewers. An audience may refer to people, assignments, groups, roles or dynamic operational context. That answers whom something targets. It does not answer whether each selected person can read the subject or perform the requested action.

For example, everyone called today may be a sensible update audience. A creative resource linked to that day can still have a narrower visibility policy. Targeting people with an update cannot make a private resource public to them.

Authority remains server-owned

The UI presents available actions, but hiding a button is not authorization. A read model can suggest that an obligation exists, but it is not canonical permission truth. Domain execution must evaluate current authority at the relevant source boundary.

This paper intentionally describes these responsibilities without publishing exact security-control configuration, private transport headers or operational recovery mechanisms. Those details are unnecessary for understanding the distinction.

Costs and consequences

Audience resolution and authorization can require separate work, even when they concern the same people. Changes in participation, scope and source visibility complicate cached views and delayed effects. The resulting model is more explicit: a recipient is not automatically a participant, an observer is not automatically a conversation member, and a descriptive job title does not silently elevate access.

The public evidence is scoped local implementation and verification. It is not a claim of complete production penetration testing or proof that every configured integration has passed hosted acceptance.